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INTRODUCTION
Choosing any two months as pivotal in the development of
statutory interpretation doctrine is a perilous enterprise, but two
events occurred in November and December 1994 that lead me to
try.
The second event, the publication of Professor William
Eskridge's book, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,' was expected.

The first event, the Republican Party's capture of both houses of
Congress, was entirely unexpected. The coincidence of this book
and this election may signal the beginning of a reevaluation of the
theories of statutory interpretation prevailing in the academy and
in the courts.
Dynamic Statutoy Interpretation marks the culmination of a
The sheer
decade of Professor Eskridge's prolific scholarship.'

t Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
tt Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A. 1982, Indiana
University; J.D. 1986, University of Michigan Law School. I am indebted to Abner
Greene, Ed Hartnett, Mark Movsesian, Lisa Nagle, Mike Paulsen, Marc Poirier,
Frederick Schauer, and Charlie Sullivan for their thoughts and comments. I also
thank Ed DuMont for his gracious help and Steve Skinner for his valuable research
assistance.
I WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994)
[hereinafter cited by page number only].
' Eskridge is the coauthor of the leading legislation casebook, WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE,JR. & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY,
LEGISLATION]. He has also written extensively on statutory interpretation. See e.g.,
William N. Eskridge,Jr., PublicLawfrom the Bottom Up, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 141 (1995);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics,Interpretation,and the Rule ofLaw,
in THE RULE OF LAW 265 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Ferejohn,
The Rule of Law]; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium,108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Foreword];
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Centuty
Statutory Interpretationin a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731 (1993); William N.

(2209)

2210 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 2209

breadth of what Eskridge accomplishes in the book is overwhelming.
He surveys a host of legal theories-originalism, legal process,
postmodernism, natural law, hermeneutics, practical reasoning,
feminist republicanism-and produces a work that teaches as much
about legal theory in general as it does about statutory interpretation in particular. Along the way, he develops his own theory of
how current political values influence the interpretation of statutes
enacted under different conditions in earlier periods-a theory of
"dynamic" statutory interpretation.
A long list of leading scholars have turned their attention to the
theory and practice of statutory interpretation during the 1980s and
1990s,3 and three of the Justices now sitting on the Supreme Court

Eskridge, Jr., The JudicialReview Game, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 382 (1993); William N.
Eskridge,Jr., Cycling LegislativeIntent, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 260 (1992); William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523
(1992); William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992); William N.
Eskridge,Jr., The New PublicLaw Movement: Moderationas a Postmodern CulturalForm,
89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme Court
Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Reneging on History?: Playingthe Court/Congress/PresidentCivil Rights Came, 79 CAL.
L. REv. 613 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Amorous Defendant:
Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2450 (1990);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/StatutoryInterpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609
(1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365
(1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in
Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988); William N. Eskridge,Jr.,
OverrulingStatutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Politics WithoutRomance: ImplicationsofPublicChoice TheoryforStatutoyInterpretation,
74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); William N. Eskridge,Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-LegalProcess Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV.
691 (1987). Eskridge candidly acknowledges that his articles are not entirely
consistent. See p. vii (crediting those who identified the inconsistencies).
'At the risk of omission, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory
Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the BigHeat:
The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation,77 MINN. L. REv. 241 (1992); Thomas
W. Merrill, ChiefJusticeRehnquis PluralistTheory, and the Interpretationof Statutes, 25
RUrGERS L.J. 621 (1994); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism,Legal Realism, and the
Interpretationof Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986);
Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning,1990 Sup. CT. REV. 231; David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation,67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in
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have written academic works in the field.4 Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation stands out from this remarkable renaissance in
statutory interpretation because it draws from and synthesizes all of
these writings to produce one of the most comprehensive theories
of statutory interpretation advanced in recent years.
Whether this theory will affect those who actually interpret
statutes remains to be seen. The United States Supreme Court has
been singularly unimpressed with the direction the academic
literature has taken;5 instead, the Court has generally adhered to an
originalist approach that emphasizes the text, intent, and purpose
of a statute as the touchstones of statutory interpretation. No single
theory of statutory interpretation explains all of the Court's recent
decisions,' but the Court most often employs an originalist
approach, despite the overwhelming consensus among academic
7
commentators that originalist theories are passe.
Eskridge shares the academy's skepticism about originalism. He
acknowledges the value of originalist sources-statutory text and
structure, legislative history and purpose-and finds some useful
insights in originalist theories. He concludes, however, that
originalist approaches to statutory interpretation are undesirable in
theory and unworkable in practice. Eskridge's theory of dynamic
statutory interpretation asserts that statutory meaning must evolve
the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).

' See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of LegislativeHistory in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992) (defending the use of legislative history); Antonin Scalia,
JudicialDeference to AdministrativeInterpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (discussing
statutory construction in the context of administrative law); John P. Stevens, The
Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373 (1992) (examining
the canons of statutory construction).
s See Schauer, supra note 3, at 231 (finding that the Court has ignored the
academic literature); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 921-22 & n.5 (noting that although
academics debate various theories of statutory interpretation, the Court tends to rely
on the plain-meaning approach).
6 Philip Frickey observes that "[the Supreme Court remains up for grabs. For
every case that seems to be a victory of textualism, another can be found that reflects
more conventional intentionalist methodologies, and the purpose approach is not
dead, either." Frickey, supra note 3, at 256 (footnotes omitted).
7
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the
LegislativeProcess: Mourningthe Death of Originalismin StatutoryInterpretation,68 TUL.
L. REV. 803, 804-05 (1994) (asserting that originalism "has now become something
of an endangered species among commentators on [statutory interpretation]");
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1073, 1088 (1992) (concluding that "originalism retains no
defenders in the academy" as a theory of statutory interpretation). For a summary
of Eskridge's discussion of the different originalist theories, see infra notes 15-29 and
accompanying text.
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over time. For Eskridge, this evolution should track current
political trends in order to achieve an interpretation of a statute
that best fits the values and goals animating current legislators,
administrative agencies, and other interested actors. Judges and
others interpreting statutes, therefore, may properly consider the
interpretation preferred by the current legislature when deciding
how to interpret a statute in particular circumstances.
Eskridge's call to rely on the values of the current legislature
takes on a new meaning in light of the Republican Party's gain of
control over both houses of Congress for the first time since 1954.
The legislative agenda previously controlled by long-term Democratic committee chairs such as Edward Kennedy, Don Edwards, and
Jack Brooks is now in the hands ofJesse Helms, Robert Packwood,
and Henry Hyde. The consequences of this transition are just
beginning to manifest themselves.
Most importantly, Newt
Gingrich, the new Speaker of the House of Representatives, brings
a revolutionary set of ideas to the fore of the congressional agenda
that could radically alter the way the federal government conducts
business with America.
The Contract with America, of which Gingrich was a primary
architect, proposes numerous radical legislative reforms. The
proposals include amending the Constitution to require a balanced
federal budget; revamping federal welfare programs; compensating
private property owners affected by environmental controls; and
reforming the nation's tort system.' The House of Representatives
has already enacted the Contract's proposals, changing its operating
procedures. 9
Whether Congress actually enacts any of these legislative
proposals in anything similar to their original form is surely
questionable, but that is not my concern here. According to
Eskridge, the very existence of this new legislative agenda has
consequences for interpreting existing statutes because the values
held by the congressional majority are values dynamic statutory
' For a summary of the proposed legislation to implement the Contract with
America, see Contract with America-Updated Overview, HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONF.
LEGIS. DIG., Jan. 11, 1995.
' In a single day, the House agreed to reduce committee staffby one-third, see 141
CONG. REC. H49 (daily ed.Jan. 4, 1995); to change the rules for calculating budgetary
figures, see id. at H52; to limit the terms of committee chairs and of the Speaker, see
id. at H55; to prohibit proxy voting in committees, id. at H58-59; to open more
committee meetings to the public, see id. at H62-63; and to require a supermajority
vote for federal income tax increases, see id. at H71-72.
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interpreters use to guide their interpretation. Thus, the meaning
of federal statutes in the world according to Newt Gingrich will be
much different than the meaning of those same statutes to the
Congresses that enacted them.
Eskridge could not have foreseen the direction in which
congressional dynamics would move when he developed his idea of
dynamic statutory interpretation. Indeed, the political culture of
the 1980s-a liberal Congress controlled by the Democratic Party
and a conservative presidency and judiciary controlled by the
Republican Party-may have exerted a subtle influence over the
liberal theories of statutory interpretation that flowered during that
time. A similar point has been made with respect to conservative
theories of executive power ° and statutory interpretation.
This
does not prove the correctness of any particular theory of statutory
interpretation, nor does it suggest that any theory springs from
partisan political considerations. But dynamic statutory interpretation will now produce politically unpopular results for those who
12
question the new congressional agenda.
o See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in PoliticalInstitutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 974 (1990) (noting that the
Republican Party since 1968 has viewed its political interests "as tied to the particular
institution that [it] inhabit[s]"); Lani Guinier, Lines in the Sand, 72 TEX. L. REV. 315,
335 n.112 (1993) ("The more vulgar explanation, at least for the attractiveness of
Scalia's views [of separation of powers], is that in an era of conservative Republican
Presidents and more liberal Democratic Congresses, a tilt toward the Presidency has
obvious meaning ... ."); Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism,
Conservatism andAdministrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 315 (1987) (noting that
President Reagan's conservative opposition to the power of the executive branch
ended once he entered office); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Cour Statutory
Interpretation,Inertial Burdens, and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L.
REV. 583, 656, 664, 673 (1991) (explaining that conservative affection for executive
power increased while the Republican Party dominated presidential politics).
n See Jerry L. Marshaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of
FederalStatutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 830-32 (1991) (discussing arguments
that the Court's deference to agency interpretations and its recent civil rights
decisions demonstrate an attempt to undermine liberal statutes); Stephen F. Ross,
ReaganistRealism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399, 420, 432 (arguing that
textualism and deference to administrative interpretations favor Republican
presidents over Democratic Congresses); Nicholas S. Zeppos, ChiefJusticeRehnquist
the Two Faces of Ultra-Pluralism,and the OriginalistFallacy, 25 RUTGERS LJ. 679, 679
(1994) (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist's statutory interpretation decisions
coincide with his political preferences). Eskridge does note that interpretive
discretion is more attractive when those with whom one agrees are doing the
interpreting. See p. 214 ("[I]nterpretive discretion was attractive [to New Deal
scholars] so long as New Dealers were doing the interpreting.").
12 1 assume that many of the academics interested in statutory interpretation
dislike much of the new Republican agenda. See generally John 0. McGinnis, The
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Eskridge's book raises far more issues than I could hope to
address in this review. My aim rather is to counter two of Eskridge's central claims.
First, Eskridge repeatedly claims that
originalist approaches are just as indeterminate and no more
constraining than dynamic approaches." This is an overstatement.
Originalist stat-utory interpretation is not inevitably dynamic.
Although originalist approaches are not completely determinate, it
is demonstrably wrong to maintain that they are just as malleable as
a dynamic approach. Second, by offering few interpretive constraints and encouraging reliance on current congressional values,
Eskridge's normative argument for dynamic statutory interpretation
leaves all statutes at the mercy of the current Congress for interpretive guidance.
Section I of this review describes how a dynamic statutory
interpreter approaches the task of interpreting statutes. Section II

PartialRepublican, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1751, 1799 (1994) (collecting sources
suggesting that "[t]here is a substantial consensus among scholars of varying political
views that the legal academy leans decidedly to the left side of the American political
spectrum"). I am generally more supportive of what the Contract with America
would do, but the point of my example is aimed at those who find Newt Gingrich's
agenda scary. The early results have been predictable: a number of law professors
have already sparred with Newt Gingrich regarding his proposals for change. See
Bruce Ackerman et al., DearNewt: 'Supermajority' Goes Too Far,LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 9,
1995, at 10, 11 (protesting as "restriking the constitutional balance" Newt Gingrich's
proposal to amend the House rules to require a three-fifths vote to enact laws that
increase income taxes).
"5See pp. 299-300 ("The main objection posed by this book is that the Rehnquist
Court's sources of authority-statutory text and tradition-are no 'harder' or
determinate than statutory purpose and are no better at screening out value
judgments by judges."); see also p. 119 (arguing thatJustice Scalia's theory "fails to
achieve its main stated goal of less judicial discretion in statutory interpretation"); p.
134 ("[B]y allowing an 'absurd result' exception to his dogmatic textualism, Scalia
allowed for just as much indeterminacy, and just as much room forjudicial play, as
he accused Brennan of creating with his context-dependent approach to statutory
meaning."); p. 230 (noting that "the new textualists' methodology is no more objective
or constraining than other methodologies"); p. 23 3 (criticizing an opinion byJustice
Scalia as revealing that "the new textualism is no more constraining than the
traditional approach"). At other points in the book, Eskridge makes the narrower
claim that originalist theories are especially indeterminate in hard cases. See p. 34

(noting that "textualism falls athwart the same difficulties that plague the other
foundationalist theories" because it "does not yield determinate answers.., in hard
cases"). But as Daniel Rodriguez notes, Eskridge defines "hard cases" so broadly that
the occasional qualification means little in practice. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The
Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919, 938-39 (1989) (reviewing
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, LEGISLATION, supra note 2); cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING
BY THE RULES 207-12 (1991) (noting that theories of interpretation determine what
will be a hard case).
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rejects Eskridge's claim that dynamic statutory interpretation is
empirically inevitable. I show that Eskridge exaggerates the
difficulties faced by originalist theories of statutory interpretation
while remaining blind to the fact that many of these same problems
plague dynamic statutory interpretation. To illustrate these points,
I examine Brown v. Gardner,14 a unanimous 1994 Supreme Court
decision invalidating a seventy-year-old veterans' benefits regulation
as contrary to the statute's plain language. Finally, Section III
responds to Eskridge's claim that dynamic statutory interpretation
is normatively desirable. As the ascendance of Newt Gingrich to the
Speaker of the House reminds those who oppose his agenda, the
Framers of the Constitution were wise to implement the formal
procedures for lawmaking in Article I, Section 7, thus constraining
the interpretive powers of the federal judiciary.
I. INTERPRETING STATUTES DYNAMICALLY

Eskridge defines dynamic statutory interpretation not by what
it is, but by what it is not. Dynamic statutory interpretation is not
originalist statutory interpretation. 5 Eskridge classifies three distinct theories as "originalist" approaches: textualist, intentionalist,
and purposive. An intentionalist approach seeks to ascertain the
intent of Congress in enacting the statute.'6 A purposive approach
pursues an interpretation that is consistent with the purposes of the
statute." A textualist approach interprets the statute according to
the meaning of the statutory language alone.' 8 Each theory,
therefore, seeks to ascertain the correct interpretation of the statute
by reference to objective criteria gleaned from some aspect of the
original statutory enactment.
Eskridge claims that all originalist theories fail because they are
indeterminate, because they do not reflect a coherent view of
political theory or legislatures, and because they produce norma14 115

S. Ct. 552 (1994).

15Eskridge credits Owen Fiss and Laurens Walker for rejecting his initial label of

"nonoriginalist statutory interpretation." See p. vii.
16 See p. 14. Legislative intent, in turn, can mean either the specific intent of the
enacting Congress or a hypothetical intent constructed by asking. What would
Congress have done if it had considered this question? See pp. 16-25 (analyzing and
criticizing theories of actual intent and imaginative reconstruction).
" See pp. 2 5 -2 6 (discussing how purposivism resolves statutory ambiguities "first,
by identifying the purpose or objective of the statute, and then by determining which
interpretation is most consistent with that purpose or goal") (citation omitted).
" See p. 34 (analyzing and criticizing the theory and practice of textualism).
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Eskridge is especially critical of
tively questionable results.
originalist claims to produce a determinate answer in specific cases,
asserting that "no originalist theory generates results in statutory
cases that can objectively be tied to majority-based preferences, and
originalist theories collectively cannot exclude evolutive values from
19
statutory interpretation."
Eskridge focuses primarily on textualism. Statutory language,
says Eskridge, is hopelessly ambiguous. This ambiguity is a result
of several factors. First, statutory language is written by a collective
author and is rewritten by other legislatures over time. 20 Second,
the legislature sometimes intentionally writes ambiguous statutory
language in order to avoid a controversial issue. 21 Third, statutory
language takes its meaning from the context in which it was
written. 22 Finally, the interpreter's own context and values necessarily influence the way she reads statutory language. 2' As a result,
"what is or is not a plain meaning is to a large extent constructed,
24
not found, by the Court."
Eskridge recognizes that the Supreme Court, and Justice Scalia
in particular, has developed a "holistic textualism" theory that relies
on contextual constraints to "produce text-based interpretive
closure even when the statutory provision being interpreted is itself
ambiguous."25 The relevant contexts include textual authorities,
such as dictionaries and case law extant when the legislature wrote
the statute, the whole statutory text and related statutory provisions,
and canons (especially clear statement rules) announcing linguistic
or policy presumptions "that will govern absent clear textual
contradiction." 26 Reliance on these contexts allows the Court to
19 P. 10.
2o See p. 38 ("Ambiguities arise because there is no single author [and] because
different authors write and rewrite provisions at different times and with different

goals.").

21 See id. (noting that ambiguities arise because "the goals of at least some of the
authors are to create rather than avoid ambiguity").
' See p. 40 ("An additional problem.., is that the meaning of text is decisively
influenced by context.").
2 See p. 41 ("[T]he interpreter's own context, including her situatedness in a
certain generation and a certain status in our society, influences the way she reads
simple texts."); see also p. 58 (noting that an interpreter is influenced by her own
institutional role and by her "frame of reference-assumptions and beliefs about
society, values, and the statute itself"); p. 2 3 7 ("[V]aluejudgments inevitably influence
the way one reads the text and legislative history of a statute ...
24 P. 290.
25 P. 42.
' Id.; see also pp. 275-97 (elaborating on these interpretive canons). For my
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understand the statutory text without looking to legislative history
or statutory purpose.
Eskridge concludes that this "holistic textualism" theory cannot
negate the importance of the interpreter's own perspective.27
Further, Eskridge perceives a willingness on the part of holistic
interpreters to sacrifice the force of the statutory plain meaning
when it conflicts with certain other values." This leads Eskridge
to suggest that "holistic textual analysis is no more determinate,
objective, or constraining than other archaeological approaches to
statutory interpretation."2 9
The assault on originalist theories convinces Eskridge that
dynamic statutory interpretation is inevitable. "The interpretation
of a statutory provision by an interpreter is not necessarily the one
which the original legislature would have endorsed, and as the
distance between enactment and interpretation increases, a pure
originalist theory becomes impossible and/or irrelevant.""0
Sometimes dynamic statutory interpretation is inevitable because of
a deliberate decision by the legislature.3 ' Interpretive questions
analysis of the Court's recent use of such canons, seeJohn C. Nagle, ClearStatement
Rules, 1995 WiS. L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 1995).
' See p. 4 2 (asserting that holistic textualism "fails because it does no better than
plain meaning to yield determinate interpretations, because the interpreter's
perspective remains critical, and because even the most ardent new textualist is willing
to sacrifice plain meaning for other values").
" See p. 4 4 ("Current values cannot easily be excluded from statutory interpretation .... "). According to Eskridge, Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504
(1989), is such a case. In Bock Laundry, the Court interpreted Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a)(1)'s impeachment balancing test to apply to civil plaintiffs,
notwithstanding the Rule's then-existing literal limitation to criminal defendants. See
id. at 509-11 (construing an earlier version of Rule 609, Fed. R. Evid. 6 0 9 (a)(1), 28
U.S.C. app. at 759 (1988) (amended 1990)). Justice Scalia concurred in the Court's
holding, concluding that the plain language of Rule 609(a)(1) would produce "an
absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result." Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Eskridge believes thatJustice Scalia's concurrence in Bock Laundry teaches that "[b]y
creating an exception to textualism when a statute requires unintended 'absurd'
consequences, Scalia conceded that following statutory text is not all that is going on
in statutory interpretation, and that current interpretive values also have a role to
play." P. 45. Eskridge thus accuses Justice Scalia of abandoning his interpretive
theory when it yields political results he dislikes. See p. 4 4 . Nicholas Zeppos reaches
a different conclusion, however, citing a number of cases in which Justice Scalia's
textualist approach led him to liberal results. See Zeppos, supra note 11, at 692 n.43.
" P. 44; see also supra note 13 (collecting Eskridge's assertions that originalism is
inevitably indeterminate).
Po 5-6.
pp.
s See pp. 112-16 (discussing the common legislative practice of delegating
lawmaking authority to agencies or courts to respond to changing circumstances).
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may be so controversial that they are avoided so that the legislation
can proceed, s2 or the legislature may use terms that it knows have
"dynamic potential" because the legislature expects the courts to
develop those terms in a manner analogous to the common law."s
In other instances, the apparent inevitability of dynamic
statutory interpretation results not from a conscious choice by the
legislature but simply from the passage of time.14 First, as time
passes, unexpected disputes may arise about the meaning of the
statute. Second, dynamic interpretation occurs because statutes
must be interpreted "in a manner 'compatible with the surrounding
body of law,' which of course changes constantly." 5 Finally,
"statutes will be construed dynamically whenever the perspective of
the interpreter departs from the perspective of the statute," which
increases over time with changed circumstances, other legal
36
developments, and political changes.
In addition to deliberate legislative choices and the passage of
time, Eskridge finds dynamic statutory interpretation inevitable
because interpreters work to avoid having their interpretation
overruled.3 7 For lower courts, this means interpreting statutes in
a manner that will not be overturned by higher appellate courts, and
ultimately by the Supreme Court. For the Supreme Court, this
a manner that will not be legismeans interpreting a statute in
38
latively corrected by Congress.
Most traditional statutory interpreters are concerned about
learning the objectively ascertainable "right" answer to an interpretive question. Not Eskridge. He candidly admits that his theory of
S2 See p. 9 (noting that some issues are "politically sidestepped").

" See p. 119. Justice Scalia coined the term "dynamic potential" in Business Elec.
Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).
" Eskridge distinguishes between a statute evolving beyond original expectations
when "successive applications of the statute occur in contexts not anticipated by its
authors," and a statute evolving against its original expectations when "subsequent
applications reveal that factual or legal assumptions of the original statute have
become (or were originally) erroneous." P. 49 (citing Farber, supranote 3). Eskridge
identifies a third evolutionary pattern in which courts trim back a broadly written
statute. See p. 140 (noting that "[l]iberalism does not object to trimming back a
broadly written statute through policy exceptions").
" P. 119 (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
S6p. 11.

-"See p. 69 (noting that "the interpreter remains constrained both by the way the
issue is framed for her from below and by the prospect that her interpretation will
be overridden from above").
s See pp. 69-70.
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dynamic statutory interpretation presumes that no single "right"
answer to specific questions of statutory interpretation can be
gleaned from originalist sources or any other objective source.39
Instead, Eskridge proposes a "critical pragmatist" theory of statutory
interpretation. The "critical" component of the theory uses "the
interpretive moment as an opportunity to evaluate the practice in
which the issue is situated, in light of criteria drawn from different
political traditions," namely liberalism, legal process, and normativism.4" The "pragmatic" component results from the interpreter's
"responsibility to take practice seriously and to consider the consequences of different interpretive choices." 41 The pragmatic aspect
of Eskridge's theory enables a dynamic statutory interpreter to find
42
all possible sources of meaning relevant and none dispositive.
A dynamic statutory interpreter freely relies on contemporary
values when interpreting a statute. Eskridge even suggests that "the
expectations of the current legislature might be more important
than those of the enacting one." 4 But the past does play a role for
a dynamic statutory interpreter. Eskridge favors a "relational agent"
metaphor in which "the agent is supposed to follow the general directives embodied in the contract and the specific orders given her
by the principal, but her primary obligation is to use her best efforts
to carry out the general goals and specific orders overtime." 44 The
agent's fundamental goal is to please the principal, so consideration
of what the principal wants today is appropriate. Eskridge thus encourages a close analysis of the statutory text, history, and purpose,
but he would not end the interpretive inquiry there.
Ultimately, a dynamic statutory interpreter seeks the most just
solution. Eskridge decries process theories that seek to produce the
s See p. 57 ("[T]he process of practical reasoning will not necessarily yield one
determinate answer, in part because different interpreters will bring different
perspectives
to the reasoning process ...
40
p. 176.
41 pp. 175-76; see also p. 193 (describing the theory as pragmatic because "the

interpreter's fidelity to the rule of law is nothing more (and nothing less) than a
sympathetic effort to understand a statute in the context of the problem at hand and

of ongoing 2practice").
00

42 See p.
(noting that "no single legal convention governs statutory interpretation, but all are relevant-statutory text, legislative intent or purpose, the best
answer").
45
p. 11.
44 p. 125; see also pp. 127-28 ("[T]he interpreter must first understand the
assumptions underlying the original directive, including its purpose. Then she must
figure out how the statute can best meet its goal(s) in a world that is not the world
of its framers.").
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right answer-what Congress intended-instead of producing thejust
answer-what the best policy is. Eskridge's own aspirations
are that statutes respect and protect individual rights, especially
those of disadvantaged groups; that broad public interest statutes
not be eroded by rent-seeking exceptions; that special interest
statutes be narrowly construed; and that statutory schemes be
allowed to change over time45 to adapt their goals to new circumstances and political values.
A dynamic statutory interpreter should "decide close cases against
politically salient interests and in favor of interests that have been
subordinated in the political process."46 Furthermore, "Republican
theory would also support interpretive presumptions which correct
47
for dysfunctions in the political process."
There is much truth in what Eskridge says. Empirically, there is
no question thatjudges (and other statutory interpreters) frequently
interpret statutes dynamically. Nor do I dispute the ultimate importance of the justice of the results achieved by any theory of statutory
interpretation. 4
But Eskridge's central claims-that dynamic
statutory interpretation is empirically inevitable and normatively
49
desirable-are less convincing.
II. THE PRACTICE OF ORIGINALISM AND THE PRACTICE
OF DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Dynamic statutory interpretation is not inevitable. Examples
abound in which courts have read statutes according to the plain
meaning of the statutory language or consistently with the original
legislative intent without asking whether contemporary purposes or

* P. 149; see also pp. 157-59 (advocating an approach to statutory interpretation
that minimizes the asymmetrical distribution of statutory benefits and costs).
46 P. 294.
47
Id.
4

"Justice," James Madison once wrote, "is the end of government."

THE

FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 352 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

49 For earlier critiques of dynamic statutory interpretation, see Redish &Chung,
supra note 7, at 831-58 (explaining how the transfer of policymaking power to the
judiciary under dynamic theories threatens foundational democratic premises and
exceeds the practical limitations on the abilities of the judiciary); Rodriguez, supra
note 13, at 936-39 (finding a dynamic statutory interpretative approach to be "an
incommensurate hybrid of different conceptions of law and interpretation"); David

E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of PracticalReason inJudicialDecisions, 65 TUL. L.

REV. 775, 787-91 (1991) (criticizing Eskridge's theory of practical reasoning and
concluding that "[i]n the end, case X is right because Eskridge and Frickey assert it

is right").
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other dynamic factors support such an interpretation. The obvious
meaning of statutory language or an uncontested recognition of
dissatisfied parties from
legislative intent can also dissuade
50
challenging the meaning of a statute.
Although dynamic statutory interpretation is not inevitable, it is
inevitably indeterminate. The sources from which a dynamic
statutory interpreter may seek evidence of statutory meaning are
limited only by the interpreter's imagination. Moreover, the pragmatic character of dynamic statutory interpretation means that there
is no single right answer to an interpretative question. Thus, the
indeterminacy of dynamic statutory interpretation far surpasses the
indeterminacy of an originalist approach.
Many of the Supreme Court's recent decisions support this
conclusion. The Court's rhetoric indicates that it continues to rely
on an originalist approach.5 When the Court confronts an interpretation that results in a policy it dislikes, it often tells the litigants
to ask Congress to amend the statute rather than fix the problem
itself. The Court's practice is similar to its rhetoric. Most recent
decisions display a decided preference for textualist and other
originalist arguments. Eskridge admits as much, yet he insists that
dynamic statutory interpretation is inevitable because it is impossible to interpret a statute using only originalist sources.5 2 The
Court's recent decisions, however, evidence ways of establishing
statutory meaning that, although not eliminating all indeterminacy,
are far more determinate and constraining than a dynamic
approach.
o See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 412-20 (1985)
(developing
this point in the context of constitutional interpretation).
51
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588,
1591 (1994) (following the "plain meaning" of the statutory language); Central Bank
v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994) (stating that adherence to the
statutory language is the starting point in every case involving statutory interpretation); FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1001 (1994) (observing that in the absence of
an express definition, a statutory term shall be construed in accordance with its
"ordinary or natural meaning"); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151,
2157 (1993) (noting that the "starting point in interpreting a statute is its language");
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594 (1992) (same);
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (same); Norfolk &
W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 128 (1991) (same); United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (noting that the task of resolving
a dispute over the meaning of a statute begins "with the language of the statute
itself").
52
See pp. 9-12.
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Consider Brown v. Gardner,53 a statutory interpretation case
decided by the Supreme Court only a few days before the publication of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation. Gardnerinvolved a provision
(§ 1151) of a statute first enacted in 1924 directing the Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA) to compensate for
an injury, or an aggravation of an injury [that occurs] as the result
of hospitalization, medical or surgical treatment, or the pursuit of
a course of vocational rehabilitation [provided under any of the
laws administered by the VA, so long as the injury is] not the
result of such veteran's own willful misconduct.... 54
Ever since its enactment, the VA interpreted the statute to include
a fault component: compensation would be provided for an injury
only if it "proximately resulted [from] carelessness, negligence, lack
of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instances of indicated
fault" by the VA, or from the occurrence during treatment or
rehabilitation of an "accident," defined as an "unforeseen, untoward" event.55
Fred Gardner underwent surgery at a VA hospital for a
herniated disc, the cause of which was unrelated to his service in the
Korean War. Afterward, he complained that the operation produced pain in his left calf, ankle, and foot. He filed a claim for
disability benefits under § 1151. Relying on its regulation, the VA
denied the claim because Gardner did not show that the VA had
acted negligently. Gardner then challenged the VA's seventy-yearold interpretation of the statute requiring a showing of fault.56
Gardnerwas an easy case for the Court. The Court unanimously
invalidated the regulation based solely on the plain language of the
statute.5 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter began by observing
"the absence from the statutory language of so much as a word
about fault on the part of the VA."5 1 Souter then rejected the VA's
argument that the statutory terms "injury" and "as a result of"
53115 S. Ct. 552 (1994).

- 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. V 1993).
55 38 C.F.R. § 3.358(c)(3) (1994). The Solicitor General explained that the VA's
interpretation "excludes from compensation only the natural worsening of a veteran's
original condition (i.e., a condition not arising out of VA treatment) and the
contemplated or reasonably foreseeable consequences of careful medical treatment."
Brief for the Petitioner at 9 n.4, Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552 (1994) (No. 931128), availablein Westlaw, Sct-brief database, 1994 WL 233282 [hereinafter Gardner
U.S. Pet'rs Br.].
56 See Gardner, 115 S. Ct. at 554.

57 See id.

s5Id. at 554-55.
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implied a fault requirement, or at least created an ambiguity
respecting a fault requirement that should be resolved in favor of
the agency.5 9 He did so even though he admitted that the word
"injury" could "carry a fault connotation."" "Ambiguity," Justice
Souter explained, "is a creature not of definitional possibilities but
of statutory context."61 Here, the context showed that "injury"
could not contain a fault connotation because the "aggravation of
an injury" phrase "refers to a condition prior to the treatment in
question, and hence cannot carry with it any suggestion of fault
attributable to the VA in causing it."6 2 Additionally, the word
"injury" was used elsewhere in the statute and in analogous statutes
63
without including a fault component.
The statutory context similarly clarified the statutory reference
to "as a result of." The natural reading of that language was "simply
to impose the requirement of a causal connection between the
'injury' or 'aggravation of an injury' and 'hospitalization, medical or
surgical treatment, or the pursuit of a course of vocational treatment. ' "64 Two further reasons counseled against reading "as a
result of" to incorporate the fault requirement sought by the VA.
First, proximate cause-not fault-operates to impose any necessary
limit on the nexus between the injury and the treatment (or
hospitalization or pursuit of treatment). 6 The second reason
derived from § 1151's compensation for injuries resulting from a
veteran's "pursuit of... rehabilitation." "If Congress had meant to
require a showing of VA fault, it would have been odd to refer to
'the pursuit [by the veteran] of vocational rehabilitation' rather than
66
to 'the provision [by the VA] of vocational rehabilitation."'
5

9 See id. at 555-56.
60 Id. at 555.
61 Id.

62

Id.

s See id. The Court's examples included 38 U.S.C. § 1701(1) (1988 & Supp. V
1993) ("The term 'disability' means a disease, injury, or other physical or mental
defect") (emphasis added), and 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (both
using the term "injury" without any connotation of fault). The Court further noted
that the regulatory interpretation of the latter provisions confirmed the absence of
a fault requirement. See Gardner, 115 S. Ct. at 555 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a)).
Additionally, the Court did not respond to the Solicitor General's examples of
"injury" used in contexts suggesting a fault requirement. See GardnerU.S. Pet'rs Br.,
supra note 55, at 13-14 & n.6.
64 Gardner, 115 S. Ct. at 555-56.
' See id. at 556 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 42 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)).
66 Id. at 556.
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The Court made one final textual observation. Section 1151
denies compensation to a veteran for additional disabilities that are
the result of the "veteran's own willful misconduct." 7 Section
1151 makes no such limitation on recovery by a veteran based on
the VA's misconduct. The Court thus deployed the textual canon
that "'[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section

of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. ' " 6
And that was it. The plain statutory language, read in context,
convinced the Court that § 1151 does not include a fault component. This approach attracted the support of all of the Justices,
including newly appointed Justice Breyer, whose prior writings suggested considerable skepticism about a plain-meaning approach.6 9
The discovery of plain statutory meaning was "'the end of the
matter'" for the Court, 7 although the Court did briefly address the
VA's nontextual arguments.
Two of the VA's nontextual arguments assumed that Congress
knew how the VA had been interpreting the statute for the last
seventy years and had seen no need to legislatively change that
interpretation.
The VA's congressional-ratification argument
asserted that Congress implicitly adopted the VA's interpretation
when Congress reenacted the statute in 1984.71 Mr. Gardner,
67 38 U.S.C. § 1151. Mr. Gardner argued that the "willful misconduct" exception
"demonstrates that the veteran is protected against even his own negligence, even
though contributory negligence was a standard defense in fault-based systems in
1924." Brief for Respondent at 12, Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552 (1994) (No. 931128), availablein Westlaw, Sct-brief database, 1994 WL 381835 [hereinafter Gardner
Resp. Br.]. The VA took the opposite tack in the United States Court of Veterans
Appeals, arguing that the exception implies that compensation is available only when
the VA is at fault. See Fred P. Gardner, 1 Vet. App. 584, 587 (1991), aff'd, 5 F.3d
1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 552 (1994).
68 Gardner, 115 S. Ct. at 556 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983)).
' See Breyer, supra note 4, at 847 (defendingjudicial reliance on legislative history
in a broad range of circumstances).
70 Gardner,115 S. Ct. at 556 (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct.
2151, 2157 (1993)).
71 The VA argued that the administrative interpretations of the 1924 Act before
1934 required a showing of fault before compensation would be authorized. Gardner
U.S. Pet'rs Br., supra note 55, at 24-31. The VA also argued that Congress enacted
the 1924 act knowing that the common law of medical malpractice did not impose
strict liability. Id. at 19-20. Thus, the VA argued that Congress knew or should be
presumed to have known of the VA's interpretations when Congress reenacted the
predecessor of § 1151 in 1934. Id. at 31-36.
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however, questioned the historical accuracy of the premise that the
VA had developed by 1934 a consistent interpretation of § 1151 that
included a fault component. 2 The Court ignored the parties'
dispute, simply observing that a congressional-ratification argument
fails to save an interpretation that conflicts with plain statutory
language.73 In any event, the Court found no evidence that
Congress was aware of the VA's interpretation when it reenacted the
statute in 1934.74
The VA's congressional-acquiescence argument focused on what
Congress did since the statute was reenacted in 1934. Congress did
nothing about the VA's interpretation, although Congress amended
the statute several times. Therefore, the VA claimed, Congress was
on notice about the agency's interpretation for at least sixty years,
and the congressional failure to amend the statute demonstrated
that Congress was satisfied with the fault concept developed by the
VA.7 5 Again, Mr. Gardner argued that the VA's interpretation
provided a moving target, with a variety of interpretations taking
shape through various agency pronouncements over the past sixty
years. 7 The Court simply responded with a broad swipe against
77
arguments based upon congressional silence.
This argument gains greater strength because there is a legitimate claim that
Congress enacted, rather than reenacted,the statute in 1934. Congress repealed the
predecessor of§ 1151 in 1933 (along with all other benefits for veterans) because of
budgetary pressures resulting from the Great Depression. See Act of Mar. 20, 1933,
ch. 3, § 17, 48 Stat. 8, 11; see also Gardner U.S. Pet'rs Br., supra note 55, at 31-34.
Congress then reversed course and reinstated in 1934 what is now § 1151. See Act
of Mar. 28, 1934, ch. 102, § 31, 48 Stat. 509, 526. For a year, however, the law was
off the books as the result of a deliberate policy decision by Congress. If the original
enactment of § 1151 dates back only to 1934, then there is more support for the
argument that Congress knew the accepted meaning of the provision when it enacted
the provision into law.
" See GardnerResp. Br., supra note 67, at 23-25.
7
3 See Gardner,115 S. Ct. at 556 (noting that "'[w]here the law is plain, subsequent
reenactment does not constitute an adoption of a previous administrative construction'" (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991))).
' See id. at 556-57 ("[T]he record of congressional discussion preceding
reenactment makes no reference to the VA regulation, and there is no other evidence
to suggest that Congress was even aware of the VA's interpretive position.").
See GardnerU.S. Pet'rs Br., supra note 55, at 36-41.
t6
See GardnerResp. Br., supra note 67, at 25-29, 31-33.
7 See Gardner, 115 S. Ct. at 557 (stating that "congressional silence 'lacks
persuasive significance'" (quoting Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1453 (1994))). The Court added that congressional silence
is particularly insignificant "where administrative regulations are inconsistent with the
controlling statute." Id. at 557 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 175 n.1 (1989)). For Eskridge's discussion of Patterson,see p. 2 4 0 (criticizing the
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In the end, the VA sought refuge in general principles of
judicial deference to administrative interpretations." The Court
brushed this argument aside, observing that "[a] regulation's age is
no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute." 9 Alternatively,
the Court recognized that an agency's consistent interpretation can
gain strength merely through the passage of time in "a close case,"
but the Court found that even this argument would be unavailable
to the VA because of the unique history of the agency's relationship
with the courts. VA decisions were not subject to judicial review
until 1988."0 Thus, quotingJudge Archer's opinion for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Court remarked
that "[m]any VA regulations have aged nicely simply because
8
Congress took so long to provide for judicial review." '
Gardner deflects many of the familiar attacks on the plain
meaning rule repeated by Eskridge. For example, the deconstructionist argument that words do not interpret themselves did
not trouble the Court. 2 Even Justice Scalia would acknowledge
this much, as Eskridge notes."3 In Gardner, however, the context
in which the contested terms appeared provided additional evidence
of their meaning. That context convinced every member of the
Court that there was a determinate answer to the interpretive
question posed by Mr. Gardner and the VA.

PattersonCourt for exhibiting "a skeptical attitude toward precedent even while it pays

lip service to stare decisis, unwilling to bootstrap prior interpretations into settled law
because of legislative inaction, and disinclined to apply statutes retroactively").
78 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 13-14, Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552
(1994) (No. 93-1128) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)), availablein Westlaw, Sct-brief database, 1994 WL
440234.
" Gardner, 115 S. Ct. at 557.
so See id.
a' Id. (quoting Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456, 1463-64 (Fed. Cir. 1993), affid, 115
S. Ct. 552 (1994)). Mr. Gardner advanced another reason why deference to the VA's
interpretation was not appropriate: the administrative opinions and other materials
on which the VA relied were not publicly available and thus constituted a "secret body
of law." Gardner Resp. Br., supra note 67, at 9 n.3, 43.

s' As Eskridge recounts, "[d]econstruction suggests that there are several different
'reasoned' solutions to an interpretive problem-or no single one." P. 193.
"Postmodern theorists believe that traditional legal reasoning is both a malleable
language game and a social creation." Id. Feminist theory states that "texts mean
nothing until they are applied in concrete contexts." P. 194.
' See p. 226. But see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509, 524-29
(1988) (rebutting the deconstructionist argument); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 921, 932-

33 (same).
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Gardneralso illustrates the common arguments against interpreting a statute consistently with its plain meaning even when the
statutory language is admittedly unambiguous. The Supreme Court
has developed exceptions to the plain meaning rule in two situations. The first exception occurs when there is evidence (usually in
the legislative history) that Congress actually intended a different
result than that suggested by the plain statutory language. A second
exception arises when the plain statutory language leads to a result
Congress could not have intended.
Eskridge argues that these exceptions swallow the plain meaning
rule. Broadly construed, they could, and in some cases would, do
just that.84 Recently, however, the Court has avoided broad
constructions of the exceptions to the plain meaning rule, both in
its rhetoric and in its practice." Plain meaning is now displaced
only if the legislative history unequivocally indicates that the
enacting Congress meant something else 6 or if the consequences
of that meaning would produce an absurd result.8 "
8'Compare Public

Citizen v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-54
n.9 (1989) (suggesting that plain meaning will not control when it creates a
"disturbingly unlikely," but not "absurd," result) with id. at 470-74 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that only "absurd" results-those that Congress could not have
possibly intended-may displace the plain meaning).
s' For examples of the rhetoric, see Negonsott v. Samuels, 113 S. Ct. 1119, 112223 (1993) ("'Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has
been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive.'" (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570
(1982))); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2. 39, 2594 (1992)
(finding that plain meaning is controlling "in all but the most extraordinary
circumstance[s]"); Freytagv. Commisioner of Internal Revenue, III S. Ct. 2631,2636
(1991) (observing that plain meaning can be displaced only in "rare and exceptional
circumstances"). The Court's recent practice of adhering to plain meaning is
described in Schauer, supra note 3, at 231 (noting that cases from the 1989 Term
demonstrate that the Court has been "relying, both in fact and in articulated
justification, on notions of plain meaning"); see also Frederick Schauer, The Practice
of PlainMeaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 716 (1992)
(citing others who agree that the Court has given increased weight to plain meaning).
But see Eskridge &Frickey, Foreword,supranote 2, at 78 ("OnlyJustice Thomas shares
Justice Scalia's zeal for text, the whole text, and nothing but the text.").
' See e.g., National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994)
(suggesting that plain meaning can be overcome by "'dearly expressed legislative
intent to the contrary'" (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169
(1993))).
' See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1454 (1994)
(noting that plain language can be overcome if it "would lead to a result 'so bizarre'
that Congress could not have intended it" (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S.

184, 191 (1991))). See generally Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of
Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principlein Statutory Interpretation,44 AM. U. L.
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Both arguments failed in Gardner. The VA argued that
testimony by General Frank Hines, the director of the Veterans'
Bureau from 1923 to 1945, demonstrated that the original 1924 Act
had a limited purpose: to provide compensation to veterans who
were injured at a VA facility "'as the result of accident or negligence
of treatment or unskillfulness.'""
Unfortunately for the VA,
General Hines also testified in favor of a no-fault statute.8 9 The
mixed signals sent by General Hines fell far short of an unequivocal
indication of congressional intent needed to displace the plain
language of § 1151. The legislative history argument thus failed to
impress the lower courts,9" and the Supreme Court did not even
discuss the extensive legislative history unearthed by the parties.
The VA also argued in the lower courts (but not in the Supreme
Court) that the plain language of § 1151's reference to an "injury
resulting in additional disability" produced an absurd result. For
example, the VA protested that it made no sense to compensate a
veteran for suffering shortness of breath after agreeing to the
removal of a diseased lung, or to compensate a veteran for the loss
of a limb after consenting to the amputation of a gangrenous
limb.9
Yet a literal reading of § 1151 "could encompass any
change in the veteran's physical condition as a result of a medical
procedure," including the above examples.92 Mr. Gardner responded that there was no "additional disability" because the lung or limb
would have been destroyed by disease anyway.9" The United States

REV. 127 (1994) (analyzing the absurd-result rule); Margaret Gilhooley, PlainMeaning
Absurd Results, and the Legislative Purpose: The Interpretationof the Delaney Clause, 40
ADMIN. L. REV. 267 (1988) (arguing that the absurd-result rule supports an
interpretation of the Delaney Clause which includes a de minimis exception).
' Gardner U.S. Pet'rs Br., supra note 55, at 23-24 (quoting World War Veterans'
Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 7320 Before the House Comm. on World War Veterans'
Legislation, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 Hearings](testimony of
General Hines)).
See 1924 Hearings,supra note 88, at 114.
o See Fred P. Gardner, 1 Vet. App. 584, 587-88 (1991) (stating that legislative
history need not be examined if the language of the statute is clear and its meaning
plain), afd, 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and affd, 115 S. Ct. 552 (1994).
91 See id. at 587. In the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General used the diseased
lung example to show that the statutory language was ambiguous, not that it
produced absurd results. GardnerU.S. Pet'rs Br., supra note 55, at 15-16. The Court
used the gangrenous limb example in a footnote to explain the problem. See Gardner,
115 S. Ct. at 552, 556 n.3.
2 Gardner, 1 Vet. App. at 587.
" See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-28, Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552
(1994) (No. 93-1128), available in Westlaw, Sct-oralarg database, 1994 WL 759078
[hereinafter GardnerOral Argument].
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Court of Veterans Appeals did not find an absurdity "'so clear as to
be obvious to most anyone'" and pointed to evidence that Congress
actually intended a no-fault statute. 4 The Supreme Court refused
to believe that Congress intended to compensate veterans in such
situations, 5 but the Court suggested a possible textual hook for
that conclusion instead of dismissing the language of § 1151 for
producing an absurd result. 6
Eskridge sees the absurd results exception as evidence that
"following statutory text is not all that is going on in statutory
interpretation, and that current interpretive values also have a role
to play." ' Once that concession is made, Eskridge would not limit
the exception to "absurd" results. He perceives "no logical reason
not to sacrifice plain meaning when it directs an 'unreasonable'
result that was probably unintended by Congress."" Here Eskridge confuses his empirical argument with his normative argument.
The distinction between "unreasonable" results and "absurd" results
matters little to a dynamic statutory interpreter who is willing to
look beyond the statutory text anyway. But the ability to distinguish
an "unreasonable" result from an "absurd" result allows an
originalist interpreter to sharply limit the number of cases in which
plain meaning is displaced. 9 Moreover, absurdity can be judged
by reference to the enacting Congress rather than to the values of
the current Congress. Thus understood, the Court's willingness to
depart from a statute's plain meaning when that interpretation
' See Gardner,1 Vet. App. at 587 (quoting Public Citizen v. United States Dep't
ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
95
See Gardner,115 S. Ct. at 556 n.3 ("It would be unreasonable, for example, to
believe that Congress intended to compensate veterans for the necessary consequences of treatment to which they consented (i.e., compensating a veteran who consents
to the amputation of a gangrenous limb for the loss of the limb).").
' See Gardner Oral Argument, supra note 93, at 9 (suggesting that "some of the
examples [regarding shortness of breath and the loss of a limb] would just not be
injuries within the meaning of the statute"); id. at 31-35 (discussing the amount of
foreseeability necessary to show that the results of a medical procedure are not an
"additional disability"). After the Court's decision in Gardner, the United States
Department ofJustice advised the VA that "only those injuries that are the certain,
or perhaps the very nearly certain, result of proper medical treatment" are excluded
from coverage under § 1151. JusticeDepartmentAdvises VA on Supreme Court Decision,
PR Newswire, Jan. 23, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, PRNews File.
97 P. 45.

9 Id.
SeeJohn C. Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 235-36 (1993) (describing
how the plain meaning of a severability clause can be given effect unless it produces
an "absurd" result).

2230 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 2209
would produce an absurd result does not introduce unlimited
indeterminacy into an originalist approach.
In short, Gardnerdemonstrates that dynamic statutory interpretation is not inevitable.'
The Court displayed little interest in the
parties' arguments about the justice of an interpretation or the
practical effects of an interpretation on the VA, Mr. Gardner, or
others. Nor did the Court suggest that the attitudes of the present
Congress were worthy of any attention.
Instead, the Court
employed a number of tools in Gardner-structural arguments and
linguistic canons-to establish that the statutory language had a plain
meaning. Eskridge fails to sustain his argument that the application
of the tools themselves results in just as much indeterminacy as a
dynamic approach.
Gardner also illustrates the indeterminacy of dynamic statutory
interpretation. Gardnerwould give a dynamic statutory interpreter
fits. Eskridge would probably say that Gardneris a case for dynamic
statutory interpretation because the VA had relied on its longstanding interpretation in fixing budget proposals and crafting a
comprehensive compensation scheme, and perhaps also because of
an implicit congressional delegation to the VA to develop the law
regarding veteran compensation programs.''
A dynamic statutory interpreter would find multiple arguments
in support of the VA's interpretation, including: the age of the
regulation, 10 2 the purpose served by the fault requirement,'
the
presumed congressional acquiescence in the VA's longstanding
interpretation, 10 4 the importance of legislative silence, 10 5 the

"oSee Sunstein, supra note 3, at 441 ("Whether normative or positive, the claim
that statutory meaning is 'indeterminate' is wildly overstated. Claims about the
inevitable indeterminacy of interpretation usually suffer from a failure to take account
of the contextual character of linguistic commands.").
101See p. 112 (stating that liberal premises support dynamic statutory interpretation when "there has been explicit or implicit statutory delegation of lawmaking
authority to agencies and/or courts").
" See p. 201 ("Unsettling [a] long-standing practice requires justification beyond
statutory plain meaning.").
...
See p. 220 (recognizing that statutory purpose is relevant in dynamic statutory
interpretation).
104 See p. 249 ("If Congress does not fulfill [its] duty [to respond to judicial and
agency interpretations of statutes], the Court is free to presume that the interpretations were correct ... ."). Eskridge would accord the greatest presumption of
correctness to a building block interpretation "(1) which is authoritative and settled,
setting a firm, decisive direction for the statute's development; (2) on which persons
subject to the statute have relied in structuring their conduct; and (3) on which public
decision-makers have relied in developing further legal rules." Id. Gardnersatisfies
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current political consensus for tort reform, 0 6 the cost of the
alternative interpretation, 107 and the need for deference to the
VA's interpretation.'
On the other hand, a dynamic statutory
interpreter would have little trouble crafting an interpretation that
supported the Court's holding in favor of Mr. Gardner. She would
note the absence of a fault requirement in the text, the structural
arguments advanced by the Court, the broad public support for
veterans' benefits, 0 9 and the need to interpret statutes in a manner
the first and third criteria. Additionally, Eskridge would apply the presumption "only
when interests hurt by the interpretation have had meaningful access to the legislative
process." P. 251. The veterans in Gardnerhad such access.
105 See p. 220 (noting that "the silence of legislators can be as significant as their
utterances").
0 The Contract with America, for example, places a strong emphasis on tort
reform. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a)(6) (1995) (finding that "the
recent explosive growth in product liability actions and punitive damage awards
jeopardizes the financial well-being of many industries, and is a particular threat to
the viability of the nation's small businesses"); see also 132 CONG. REC. S13,648-01
(daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that federal tort-reform
legislation is needed because state courts have "discarded traditional concepts of tort
law that require negligence or recklessness in order to recover in favor of an
expanded doctrine of strict liability"). That impulse suggests that the new Republican
congressional majority would look favorably on the VA's desire to employ a fault
standard.
107 The VA originally claimed that a contrary decision would cost $5 billion over
five years, see 138 CONG. REC. S4040 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1992), but later reduced that
estimate to $1 billion, see Brief for Amici Curiae Paralyzed Veterans of America et al.
in Support of Respondent at 18-22, Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552 (1994) (No. 931128), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File. After the Supreme Court's
decision in Gardner,the VA estimated that the decision would cost $324.2 million in
1995. See Hearing on FY96 Budget-Veterans Affairs Before the Senate Veterans Affairs'
Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1995) (statement of VA Secretary Brown). Whatever
the actual cost, the decision has been noticed. See Restore VA Liability Limit,
OREGONIAN (Portland), Jan. 4, 1995, available in Westlaw, Ptldogn database
(editorializing that "Congress should quickly correct" the ruling because it "opens up
U.S. taxpayers to needless expense").
" Eskridge finds the vision in Chevron, (Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)), of agencies as primary statutory interpreters
and courts as secondary interpreters to be consistent with the greater accountability
of agencies in the political process. See p. 161. None of his qualifications on
deference to agency interpretations appear to apply to Gardner. See p. 161 ("Courts
should not defer to new agency interpretations when constitutional or other statutory
rights are implicated, when the agency is shifting policy dramatically away from
congressional preferences and toward presidential ones, or when the agency itself is
acting nondeliberatively....").
109 See, e.g., Kaiser/Harvard Election Night Survey (K.R.C. Communications
Research, Nov. 15, 1994) (summarizing the results of a survey conducted November
8, 1994, in which 93% of the responding voters opposed a decrease in veterans
benefits), available in DIALOG, Poll file.
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favorable to veterans."'
Ultimately, then, a dynamic statutory
interpreter would have to reach a conclusion based on which
interpretation makes the most sense today. The VA and disabled
veterans would answer that question differently, and it is unclear
which answer the current Congress would provide.
Another example in which a dynamic statutory interpreter would
make an easy statutory case hard is Gay Rights Coalitionof Georgetown
University Law Center v. Georgetown University.'
The provision of
the D.C. Human Rights Act at issue in Gay Rights Coalition prohibited a school from denying "the use of, or access to, any of its
facilities and services to any person otherwise qualified" based on
sexual orientation." 2 A group of gay law students at the Georgetown University Law Center challenged the school's refusal to
provide them equal access to university facilities or official university recognition. Georgetown University responded that the Act
did not apply to a school whose religious teachings oppose
homosexuality. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that Georgetown had to provide the students with access to
university facilities, but that it did not have to formally recognize
...
Eskridge proposes a tiebreaker for close cases that would favor the party or

group with less access to the legislative process and therefore the party less likely to
convince Congress to overturn a contrary decision. See p. 153. Under this theory,
Mr. Gardner would win because the federal government has greater access to
Congress than veterans do. See id. (ranking certain groups' relative access to
Congress to override unfavorable Supreme Court decisions and placing the federal
government at the top). Along these lines, Mr. Gardner relied on an interpretive
canon that encourages liberal construction of veterans' benefits statutes in favor of
veterans. GardnerResp. Br., supra note 67, at 22. The Court did acknowledge that
interpretive doubts should be resolved in favor of a veteran, see Gardner,115 S. Ct.
at 555 (citing Kingv. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215,220 n.9 (1991)), but it did not
rely on that canon in reaching its decision. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, however, did rely on that canon in the opinion below. See
Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The World War Veterans' Act
was remedial legislation and as such should be construed broadly to the benefit of the
veteran.").

11 536 A.2d I (D.C. 1987).

112 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520 (1993). The D.C. Human Rights Act more broadly
states:
It is an unlawful discriminatory practice.., for an educational institution:
(1) To deny, restrict, or to abridge or condition the use of, or access to, any
of its facilities and services to any person otherwise qualified, wholly or
partially, for a discriminatory reason, based upon the race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual
orientation, family responsibilities, political affiliation, source of income or
physical handicap of any individual.
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them. n 3 Congress reacted to the decision by amending the
Human Rights Act to exempt religious schools from the sexual
orientation provisions, but Georgetown decided to provide the
4
students with the requested facilities and services anyway.1
I easily conclude that the plain language of the "facilities and
services" provision of the Human Rights Act supported the students'
claims. The students sought access to "facilities and services" at the
University, and the Human Rights Act guaranteed them precisely
that. Moreover, Georgetown apparently denied such facilities and
services "based upon" the sexual orientation of the students."'
The real issue in the case was not whether the statute's direction to
provide facilities and services applied to Georgetown-it plainly didbut rather whether the statute could be applied constitutionally to
6
the university."
A dynamic statutory interpreter would struggle to reach a
determinate result in Gay Rights Coalition. Although the plain
language of the "facilities and services" provision pushes toward the
interpretation advanced by the students, several factors would pull
a dynamic statutory interpreter toward the reading of the Human
Rights Act favored by Georgetown. A dynamic statutory interpreter
would recognize that liberal premises support reading statutes to
avoid overenforcement of statutory norms.,1 7 Eskridge finds
United Steelworkers v. Weber"-holding that Title VII of the Civil

"' The court determined that the plain language of the Human Rights Act
required access to "facilities and services" and that such a result did not violate
Georgetown University's free exercise rights. See Gay Rights Coalition,536 A.2d at 2639. By contrast, the Human Rights Act did not require the University to "endorse"
a private group of students, and imposing such a requirement would violate the Free
Exercise Clause. See id. at 17 (interpreting the Human Rights Act to require
Georgetown University to endorse the students "would defeat the plain language of
the statute and simultaneously transform the Human Rights Act into a patent invasion
of the First Amendment").
n4 See p. 182.
"I See Gay Rights Coalition,536 A.2d at 27-29.
16 The court sought to interpret the statute in accordance with the related (but
different) interpretative canons favoring those interpretations that avoid holding
statutes unconstitutional or that avoid even having to decide difficult constitutional
issues. See id. at 16. But neither rule affected the court's result. The court
concluded that the plain language of the Human Rights Act did not extend to
endorsements, thereby rendering gratuitous the court's further conclusion that such
an interpretation would violate the Free Exercise Clause. On the other hand, the
court required Georgetown to provide access to services and facilities notwithstanding
the constitutional issue raised by that interpretation of the Human Rights Act.
' See p. 136.
11 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Eskridge describes Weber as "the most controversial
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Rights Act of 1964 does not prohibit private affirmative action
plans"--defensible on this basis. 2 The same principle would
support Georgetown's reading of the Human Rights Act.
A dynamic statutory interpreter would also try to avoid being
"overruled" by the legislature.' 21 Indeed, Eskridge chides the
Supreme Court for miscalculating the congressional response that
resulted in the legislative reversal of five 1989 civil rights decisions. 122 But the Gay Rights Coalition court suffered an even
speedier legislative reversal. Congress first tried to overturn the
decision by denying funds to the District of Columbia. 23 When
the courts invalidated that approach, 124 Congress proceeded to
amend directly the D.C. Human Rights Act to exempt religious
institutions from the prohibition on discrimination based on sexual
12 5
orientation.
Current congressional values would guide a dynamic statutory
interpreter deciding Gay Rights Coalition. The congressional reversal
of the decision provides some after-the-fact evidence that the court
misjudged those values. Beyond that, there was little current
societal consensus in 1987 regarding the appropriate treatment of
homosexuals in general and the appropriate treatment of homosexuals by the church in particular. Moreover, two developments since
1987 would favor Georgetown in the eyes of a dynamic statutory

statutory decision of the last thirty years." P. 109.
"' See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
120 See pp. 136, 140; see also p. 173 ("Inspired by the civil rights movement and
Brown, I accept Weber ... but remain skeptical that [it] represents anything more than
ambiguous progress.").
121 See pp. 11-12. The unique status of the District of Columbia makes Gay Rights
Coalitionthe unusual case in which two different legislative bodies enjoy the authority
to overrule the decision: the District of Columbia Council and Congress. On the
other hand, Congress has the power to overrule any state court decision based on
state law in those spheres in which the Constitution authorizes Congress to legislate.
Eskridge does not indicate which legislative body should be considered by a dynamic
statutory interpreter (indeed, Eskridge rarely discusses state law), but his general
concern about legislative overruling suggests that any legislative body with the power
to overrule a judicial decision will be relevant to a dynamic statutory interpreter.
'

See p. 262.

See District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462,
§ 145, 102 Stat. 2269, 2269-14.
124 See Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
the Appropriations Act violated the First Amendment rights of the District of
Columbia Council members to express their views as legislators on political issues),
12

vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding the action moot
after the last extension of the appropriation statute).
125 See Pub. L. No. 101-168, § 141, 103 Stat. 1267, 1284 (1989).
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interpreter if the case arose today. First, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, enacted by Congress in 1993, strengthens the rights
of religious institutions confronted with the issue faced by
Georgetown.126 Second, further evidence of current congressional
values comes from the rightward movement in the 1994 congressional elections.
Gay Rights Coalition also shows that an interpreter's own values
need not determine the answer to a statutory question. 12 As he
explains in his detailed discussion of the case, Eskridge is gay, a professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, and the faculty
adviser to the students. 121 Yet he describes Gay Rights Coalition
as "a hard case" with no single right moral answer. 129 I approach
the case from a different perspective, being an evangelical Christian
and having lived in Washington at the time with a number of
friends (one of whom is now my wife) who worked for Senator
Armstrong (the author of the congressional amendment overturning
the decision).' ° But the plain language of the D.C. Human
Rights Act makes Gay Rights Coalition an easy statutory interpretation case for me.
To say that dynamic statutory interpretation is not inevitable
is not to say that it never occurs. Statutes lend themselves to
dynamic interpretation in a number of circumstances. There are,
1
2

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (1993). See generally Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious
Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 249 (1995) (discussing the ramifications
of RFRA on existing laws). The courts have reached conflicting results in determining the application of RFRA to claims of religious-based decisions against unmarried
couples. CompareSwanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1994) (holding that RFRA does not empower a landlord to exclude unmarried
couples because the state has a compelling state interest in preventing discrimination), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994), with Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing
Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 409-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that, under
RFRA's compellingstate interest test, California's interest in prohibitinghousing discrimination based on marital status did not outweigh the landlord's right to exclude
unmarried, cohabiting tenants in accordance with the landlord's religious beliefs).
17 Eskridge indicates at several points that an interpreter's own values will
influence statutory interpretation. See pp. 41, 44, 58-60, 237.
inevitably
12
s See pp. 180, 189.
12 See pp. 181, 198.
1 The appropriate position of the Church with respect to homosexuality and
homosexuals raises issues far beyond the scope of this review. Suffice to say that
although I read Scripture differently than Eskridge, see p. 191, 1 wholeheartedly agree
with his observation that "[b]igotry, cruelty, and hypocrisy are inconsistent with the
teachings of Jesus Christ-in whose name Christian doctrine is promulgated-as
reported in the Gospels." Id.
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of course, numerous instances in which statutory language is not
plain even in context. A commonly cited example is the Sherman
Act,' which the Supreme Court has treated over the past century
32
as an invitation to construct a body of federal antitrust law.1
Eskridge recounts a similar example in his extensive discussion of
the dynamic judicial decisions interpreting various federal statutes
to authorize labor injunctions during the end of the nineteenth
century and the beginning of the twentieth century. 33 Another
instance of dynamic statutory interpretation occurs when statutes
expand to coincide with expanded interpretations of the Constitution.134 Courts also engage in dynamic statutory interpretation to
resolve issues that Congress deliberately avoided when it enacted a
statute. A search for legislative intent will not be fruitful if the
enacting Congress did not intend anything related to the issue in
dispute.
These examples of dynamic statutory interpretation simply show
that originalist theories do not produce determinate results in all
cases and that courts will turn to dynamic statutory interpretation
in some cases. Eskridge, however, makes a much broader claim:
dynamic statutory interpretation is inevitable because originalist
theories are just as indeterminate as any other theory. 3 5 Brown
v. Gardner offers just one example where Eskridge is wrong. Originalist theories can produce determinate results in contested cases;
dynamic statutory interpretation is not inevitable in all cases. The
empirical possibility of both approaches leaves open the normative
question of which is the better approach.
III. DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE 104TH CONGRESS

The 1994 congressional election created an inescapable tension
between three fundamental tenets of Eskridge's theory. He insists
that dynamic statutory interpretation is normatively desirable. He

' Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
1"' See, e.g., Redish & Chung, supra note 7, at 868-69.
...
See pp. 81-109. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of jurisdictional
grants as authority to fashion federal common law, see PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART

AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 883-85 (3d ed.

1988).
"3See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 839-41 (1995)
(allowing the Federal Arbitration Act to expand with the Commerce Clause).
135 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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articulates a normative vision that promotes rights for those who are
politically and socially marginalized in the United States. And he
maintains that the ultimate measure of any theory of statutory
interpretation is the justice of the results it produces. These three
tenets could coexist when Eskridge wrote his book: a dynamic
statutory interpreter would consult the values of the current
Congress when interpreting a statute; the values of Congress for the
last forty years have been increasingly receptive to the parties that
Eskridge wants to protect; thus, a dynamic statutory interpretation
would favor those interests. But now when a dynamic statutory
interpreter looks to Congress for interpretive guidance, she finds
Newt Gingrich and the Contract with America.
The composition of the 104th Congress thus reveals how dynamic statutory interpretation is normatively questionable in two
related areas. A dynamic statutory interpreter wrongly assumes
policymaking authority from the political branches. Viewed from
the opposite perspective, a dynamic statutory interpreter fails to
recognize the need to constrain statutory interpreters. Both failures
suggest that dynamic statutory interpretation is unfaithful to the
rule of law and to democratic theory as those ideas have been
historically understood.
A. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Updating Statutes
to Reflect Current CongressionalValues
A dynamic statutory interpreter assumes that she enjoys some
responsibility for updating statutes to reflect current policies. She
faces two challenges in doing so. The first challenge concerns her
competence to determine which current policies should guide the
interpretation of previously enacted statutes. Although at times
Eskridge indicates that a dynamic statutory interpreter may engage
in a general inquiry into contemporary social norms, he is most
interested in current congressional policy. To ascertain that policy,
Eskridge is willing to look at a broad range of formal and informal
materials for evidence of Congress's current preferences. 6
"56See p. 152 (suggesting that "less formal postenactment legislative signals, such
as statements in committee reports, can provide useful information to the Court
about the nature and intensity of current congressional preferences"); see alsoJames
J. Brudney, CongressionalCommentaiy onJudicialInterpretationsof Statutes: Idle Chatter
or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1994) (defending judicial reliance on
particular subsequent legislative signals to avoid imposing opportunity costs on
Congress).
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Eskridge's own examples demonstrate the difficulty of this task.
He charts how congressional and executive attitudes toward
abortion counseling under Title X developed throughout the 1970s,
1980s, and early 1990s. The Bush Administration promulgated
regulations prohibiting abortion counseling in programs receiving
federal funds under Title X. In Rust v. Sullivan,137 the Supreme
Court upheld that interpretation as within the range of permissible
interpretations of the 1970 legislation. Eskridge criticizes the Bush
Administration regulations as contrary to the policy preferences of
Congress in the 1980s. 3
He finishes the story by noting President Clinton's executive orders repealing the Bush Administration
13 9
regulations prohibiting abortion counseling.
Since then, however, Congress received a new Republican
majority that includes three dozen new Representatives of the
House and five new Senators who oppose abortion.1 40 This may
not be enough to swing the congressional median to a position
consistent with the Bush Administration regulations, and it
certainly falls short of what would be needed for the inevitable
by President Clinton, but it does reveal the precariousness of
placing too much reliance on rapidly shifting congressional
preferences when interpreting existing legislation. The example also shows the difficulty in ascertaining precisely what a
majority in Congress prefers at any given time. The new prolife members of Congress may oppose a Title X abortioncounseling ban, even though they favor other restrictions
on abortion,14 1 but asking a dynamic statutory interpreter to
divine such a fine distinction in congressional values asks too
much.
Eskridge, no doubt, would respond that the values of Newt
Gingrich and the Contract with America are not the values of...
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
l See p. 290 ("[Ilt is clear that Congress in 1991 disagreed with the HHS gag
rule.").

...
See p. 381 n.121.

' 4 See Spotlight Stoty the Day After: Pro-Lifers Declare Their Movement Revived,
ABORTION REP. (Am. Political Network), Nov. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis

Library, Abtrpt File (quoting a press release issued by the National Abortion Rights
Action League); see also The Escalating War on Legal Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1995, at 18 (noting that abortion opponents form a majority in both the House and
the Senate).
14 See Richard S. Dunham, Lesson No. I for Newt's Rebels: Tactical Retreat, Bus.
WEEK, Dec. 26, 1994, at 77, 77 (suggesting that "the GOP is backtracking on promises
... to reinstitute the ban on abortion counseling in federally funded clinics").
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well, Eskridge never really does say whose values a dynamic interpreter should seek. The closest he comes to identifying such values
is in his discussion of median legislature preferences in Rust and
Weber. But ascertaining the values of the median legislator in the
current Congress with respect to an existing statute is at least as
difficult as the originalist tasks Eskridge dismisses as impossible.
Nonetheless, Eskridge would surely insist that whoever the median
legislator is in the 104th Congress, it is not Newt Gingrich. I accept
that. At the same time, by Eskridge's own criteria, Gingrich exercises more influence than any single legislator has possessed for
years. He controls the House agenda, he exercises substantial influence over the selection of the House committee chairs, and the
political strategy he promotes helped some new members gain their
seats-all of which display the kind of power over the legislative
agenda that Eskridge finds relevant in gleaning the meaning of a
statute. 142 Moreover, many of Gingrich's ideas are shared by the
Republican House members who signed the Contract with America
and voted for its provisions with little dissent. That document has
provided a legislative blueprint that directs the actions of the 104th
Congress. The upshot is that the Contract with America, and Newt
Gingrich in particular, can make a powerful claim to embody a significant portion of the 104th Congress.
The second challenge in updating statutes to reflect current
policies concerns the authority of a dynamic statutory interpreter to
rely on current policies when interpreting an existing statute.
Originalist theories deny any such authority. They instead view any
statutory changes as the responsibility of the legislature. If a statute
needs updating, the legislature should amend it. If the legislature
does not do so, and the statute becomes irrelevant because of
changed circumstances, so be it. Judicial assumption of this task, by
43
contrast, is countermajoritarian1
Eskridge understands this argument. 144 Nonetheless, he pro142 See pp. 34-37 (discussing how control of the legislative agenda can break

"majority cycling"); see also p. 78 (noting that committee "'gatekeeping' power over
issues on the legislative agenda" affords "substantial ability to head off overrides,
especially if they are supported by the majority party leadership").
145Redish and Chung defend this originalist view, specifically concluding that "the
framers contemplated and condoned the possibility that statutes would become
anachronistic and obsolete; legislative inertia was simply part of the bargain: the cost
of attaining political stability by ensuring that society would not be thrown into

tumult with every shift in political opinion." Redish & Chung, supra note 7, at 877.
144 See p. 298 (recognizing that "[t]he meta-rule indicated by a conservative version
of the legal process philosophy is that shifts in national policy should be made by the
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vides a dynamic statutory interpreter with several justifications for
departing from the traditional originalist understanding to consciously weigh policy choices. His first claim is historical. Eskridge
defends judicial reliance on current values as consistent with, and
indeed expected by, the Framers. 4 5 He relies on The Federalist
No. 78, in which Alexander Hamilton extolls the virtues of an
independent judiciary as "an essential safeguard against the effects
of occasional ill humors in the society" that result in "unjust and
partial laws."' 46 Hamilton deems the judiciary "of vast importance
in mitigating the severity, and confining the operation of such
laws." 4 ' Eskridge reads this as a general invitation for a dynamic
statutory interpreter to rely on current congressional values. But
Hamilton follows this passage by warning that "[t]o avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should
be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them."14 Hamilton also repeatedly asserts that the judiciary will
not substitute its own will for that of the legislature. For example,
Hamilton explains:
It can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretense of a

repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature ....

The courts must declare the

sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the
49
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.

political process and not by the courts").
14 See p. 156.
146 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).7
14 Id. Hamilton adds that the judiciary
not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may
have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in
passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous
intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a
manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they meditate, to
qualify their attempts.

Id.
48

1 Id.
4

at 529.

MId. at 526; see also THE FEDERAUST No. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob

E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("Particular misconstructions and contraventions of the will of
the legislature may now and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to
amount to an inconvenience, or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the
political system."); id. at 546 ("There never can be danger that the judges, by a series
of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united
resentment of the body entrusted with it...."). Eskridge discounts the first quote
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These are not the words of a dynamic statutory interpreter.
Eskridge also makes a separation of powers argument for
interpretive reliance on current congressional values. The Framers,
writes Eskridge, wanted "to leave the legislative agenda uncluttered
by issues of fine-tuning and application, and relatively free to focus
on the major policy issues." 150 Eskridge offers a further defense
based on the assumption that the difficulty in enacting statutes
implies that they should be expected to remain effective for a
lengthy period of time. 51 He cites no authority for either proposition. The theory of separation of powers underlying both claims is
controversial. Martin Redish and Theodore Chung, for example,
have argued that dynamic statutory interpretation disserves
legislative supremacy; invites judges to exercise a policymaking
function unauthorized by the Constitution; and generally overlooks
the issue of "who gets to determine what is and is not in the 'public
interest.'"152 Eskridge's assumption that statutes have a long
lifespan is further undercut by the many federal statutes that must
53
be periodically reauthorized lest they expire.1
from The FederalistNo. 78 above as confined to Hamilton's discussion of judicial
review, see p. 3 6 6 n.32, but the context is not so limited. Similarly, although Eskridge
is correct that Hamilton never directly stated that the "will of the Legislature"
constrainsjudicial interpretation ofstatutes, see p. 118, the quotes above indicate that
Hamilton had that in mind.
0 P. 132.
" See p. 48 (asserting that statutes are "aimed at big problems and must last a
long time"); pp. 130-31 ("[B]oth liberal theory and the Constitution contemplate that
Congress will enact statutes; the assumption in both 1789 and today is that statutes
will have an indefinite life-well beyond that of the enacting Congress.").
152 Redish & Chung, supra note 7, at 852 (emphasis added). For a similar view of
the relationship of the constitutional separation of powers to statutory interpretation,
see Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of FederalCourts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
1,19,32-33 (1985) (discussing the danger ofjudicial usurpation of federal lawmaking
power, which was intended to be vested in the legislative branch). Eskridge discusses
the institutional competence of courts and agencies to make statutory policy at pp.
161-73.
" See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1542 (1988) (limiting authorization of appropriations). Several members of the 104th Congress have seized on the
necessity of reauthorizing the Endangered Species Act as leverage to seek sweeping
changes to the act. See, e.g., Michele Kay, EndangeredSpecies Act Becomes Threatened
Itself, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 28, 1995, at A13 (suggesting that Congress may
decline to appropriate funds for the ESA in order to kill the legislation); William K.
Stevens, U.S. Effort to Return Farm Land to NaturalState Wins Praise,N.Y. TIMES,Jan.
10, 1995, at C4 ("The issue [of conservation] is expected to get a thorough airing in
the new Republican-dominated Congress since ... the Endangered Species Act [is]
up for reauthorization this year.").
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Eskridge next responds to the countermajoritarian difficulty of
having unelected judges making new law by observing that our
political system is not strictly majoritarian anyway. ' This argument confuses the judicial role in interpreting statutes with judicial
review for unconstitutionality. i5 It also undermines the justification for dynamic statutory interpretation. To assume, as Eskridge
does, that unenacted majority preferences should be the basis of the
interpretation of federal statutes cuts against the constitutional
checks on the immediate transformation of majority preferences
into law. Eskridge recognizes that the Framers understood the
undesirability in immediately translating congressional notions of
beneficial public policy into law,' 56 but his argument here neglects
it. Eskridge makes the same mistake when he asserts that "[t]o the
extent that the dynamic interpretation is consistent with current
legislative desires, the countermajoritarian difficulty is ameliorated." 117 Interpreting federal statutes consistently with the preferences of Newt Gingrich may now be majoritarian, but the constitutional structure imposes a number of hurdles specifically so that
158
those preferences do not immediately become law.

" See p. 156 ("A final response to the countermajoritarian difficulty is to
recognize that our polity is not majoritarian.").
...
Redish and Chung elaborate:
Interpreting a statute already deemed to have passed constitutional muster
...cannot be properly equated with the task of reviewing a statute to
determine whether Congress has transgressed the constitutional boundaries
that confine its activity. In exercising its power of judicial review, the
judiciary is enforcing the counter-majoritarian norms embodied in the
Constitution. It makes perfect sense to entrust to the one branch purposely
insulated from majoritarian pressures the power to interpret and enforce
this document. For issues of social policy not controlled by the Constitution, however, the judiciary lacks authority or legitimacy to act in ways
inconsistent with congressional directives. This constraint exists for the very
same reason that thejudiciary is entrusted with the power ofjudicial review:
its lack of accountability to the electorate.
Redish & Chung, supra note 7, at 851.
"5See p. 291 ("[T]he framers did not contemplate that what Congress desired as
public policy would immediately become so.").
157 p. 152.
" Abner Greene supports reliance on current congressional values in a much
narrower category of cases than Eskridge would allow. See Abner S. Greene, Checks
and Balances in an Era of PresidentialLawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 193-95
(1994) (proposing to allow current congressional preferences to govern statutory
interpretation when Congress passes a concurrent resolution specifically disapproving
an executive agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute). The scenario to which
Greene responds occurred in Rust v. Sullivan, 560 U.S. 173 (1991). Congress passed
an ambiguous statute; an executive agency interpreted the statute in a manner
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The 104th Congress presents Eskridge with a new problem.
There is a growing tension between Eskridge's instruction to rely on
current policy values, especially those of Congress, and Eskridge's
normative vision. As noted above, Eskridge's aspiration is for
statutes to protect individual rights (especially the rights of
disadvantaged groups), to eliminate rent-seeking exceptions from
broad public-interest statutes, to narrowly construe special-interest
statutes, and to enable statutory schemes "to change over time 15to9
adapt their goals to new circumstances and political values."
These values inform the harsh critique of the Supreme Court's 1989
civil rights cases with which Eskridge concludes his book.160
What Eskridge's willingness to allow statutes "to change over
time to adapt their goals to new circumstances and political values"
means with the 104th Congress is best demonstrated by the
Endangered Species Act (ESA)." 1 Few statutes have experienced as
great a shift in congressional favor as the ESA. Enacted by
Congress by an overwhelming bipartisan majority in 1973,162 the

ESA has steadily lost congressional support since then. The slip
probably began with Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,1"' in which
the Supreme Court interpreted the plain language of the ESA to
block the completion of a $110 million dollar dam that threatened
contrary to current congressional preferences; the courts upheld the agency's
interpretation under Chevron deference (Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); and the President overrode congressional efforts to

amend the statute. See Greene, supra, at 182-83; see also p. 273 (using this as an
example of how divided government makes congressional overrides of presidential
vetoes "triply difficult"). Although I do not necessarily endorse Greene's proposal,
it demonstrates the possibility of limiting consideration of current congressional
values to much more narrow circumstances than Eskridge would permit.
159p. 149.

" See pp. 29 7 -3 06 . Eskridge instructs a dynamic statutory interpreter to develop

"substantive economic and critical analyses of civil rights and other policy concerns
handled by the modem administrative state-and to be guided by those insights rather
than by abstract procedural doctrines." P. 274. Although Eskridge does not offer a
complete account of his substantive vision on civil rights, Newt Gingrich's views may
not be as distant as Eskridge would think. See 139 CONG. REC. H1479 (daily ed. Mar.
18, 1993) (statement of Rep. Gingrich) (remarking that "there is no problem in
America more important than saving the inner city, no problem in America more
important than addressing the concerns of the poorest and neediest of Americans").
161

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

12 The House approved the Act by a vote of 355 to 73. See SENATE COMM. ON
ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, AS AMENDED IN 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, AND

1980, at 483-84 (1982). The Senate approved the Act on voice vote, see id.at 474,

having passed an earlier version of the bill by a vote of 92 to 0, see id. at 410.
1 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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the existence of the tiny snail darter. The ESA has been amended
several times to qualify its original unequivocal prohibitions, but
much of its sweeping character remains. It has experienced a
revival in recent years as environmental groups and the federal
government have relied on the Act to block timber sales in the
Pacific Northwest that threatened the northern spotted owl." 6
The 104th Congress appears hostile to the ESA. 65 Seeing this,
a dynamic statutory interpreter would read the ESA narrowly for
two reasons: she would want to consider current congressional
values, and she would not want to be legislatively overruled. A
dynamic statutory interpreter would thus disagree with the Fish and
Wildlife Service's broad interpretation of the ESA to prohibit
"significant habitat modification."'6 6 A divided federal court of
appeals found the agency's interpretation inconsistent with the
ESA,'6 7 and the Supreme Court has agreed to resolve the dispute.' 68 The case has generated interest in Congress, where the
advocates of amending the ESA have attacked the agency's "errone64

' See Albert Gidari, The EndangeredSpecies Act: Impact of Section 9 on Private
Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419,426-40 (1994) (describing the spotted owl controversy);
see also Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1994)
(enjoining the U.S. Forest Service from conducting any timber sales, range activities,
or road building projects until it engages in required consultation procedures
regarding the threatened Snake River chinook salmon).
63Legislation has been proposed in the 104th Congress to impose a moratorium
on the listing of endangered and threatened species and the designation of critical
habitat for those species. The legislation would also provide compensation to private
parties who own property designated as critical habitat. See H.R. 490, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995); S. 191, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). For additional examples of
opposition to the ESA and proposals to amend it, see 141 CONG. REC. E134-01 (daily
ed.Jan. 19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bonilla) (stating that the Act "must be reconstructed with amendments which not only protect the environment, but respect
property rights"); 141 CONG. REC. S825 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Packwood) (criticizing "the devastating effects of the sole-purpose Endangered Species
Act"); 141 CONG. REC. S790 (daily ed.Jan. 11, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hutchinson)
(proposing legislation "to stop Government overreaching until we have had time to
revise the Endangered Species Act"). Another proposed bill would empower the
Secretary of the Interior to decide that a particular species is not worth saving. See
Timothy Egan, Industries Affected by EndangeredSpecies Act Help a SenatorRewrite Its
Provisions,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at A20 (describing legislation to be introduced
by Sen. Gorton of Washington).
16 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (defining statutory "harm" to endangered species to "include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding,
feeding or sheltering").
" See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d
1463, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
16 See 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
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ous" interpretation for "depriving people of their private property
rights."' 69 Such specific congressional signals are valuable to a
dynamic statutory interpreter.
But the history of the ESA shows that Congress can be entrusted
with updating statutes. Congress has repeatedly amended the ESA
to strike a new balance when it disliked the results of an agency or
judicial interpretation. Amendments in the aftermath of Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill established a "God Squad" comprised of
designated federal officials authorized to waive the requirements of
the Act on a case-by-case basis.170 Congress amended the ESA in
1982 to eliminate consideration of economic factors in deciding
whether to list a species as endangered or threatened.17 ' The
104th Congress is engaged in a similar process now.1 72 Congress
has thus demonstrated the willingness and capacity to balance the
competing arguments and reconcile the conflicting norms characteristic of the debate over endangered species. The lesson is that
Congress updates a statute when it determines that it is important
to do so. Dynamic statutory interpretation based on current but
unenacted congressional values is thus unnecessary.
B. Dynamic Statutory Interpretationand Interpretive Constraints

Originalism is alluring to judges. They continue to use its
rhetoric and to rely on it in practice.17 Even Eskridge admits that
a textualist approach is attractive to a court that is concerned about
the rule of law and that wants to avoid giving the impression that it
is making law.' 74 In other words, judges who interpret statutes
speak and act as if they are constrained.
169
170

140 CONG. REC. H4816 (daily ed.June 22, 1994) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, sec. 3,

§ 7, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752.
171See Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982).
1 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
17 Even dynamic statutory interpreters succumb to originalist rhetoric. For
example, in Taber v. Maine, 45 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1995), the court opined that "it is
not for us to say whether Feres, even if wise and appropriate when decided, yields
appropriate or sensible results today." Id. at 614 (referring to Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135 (1950)). These words were written by Judge Calabresi, a prominent
dynamic statutory interpreter when he taught at Yale. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTEs 2 (1982) (endorsing judicial updating of

statutes). Eskridge is skeptical of Calabresi's proposal. See pp. 154-55 (noting that
"[i]n most cases it is hard to tell what the 'popular will' is, and it is even more
doubtful that legal elites are able to discern it reliably").
174See p. 272.

2246 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 2209
Frederick Schauer has suggested that the Supreme Court's
increasing reliance on the plain meaning of statutory text to resolve
statutory interpretation cases results from a desire to obtain
common ground. 175 Language works imperfectly, he agrees, but
consider the alternatives. A complete understanding of a statute's
context may lie beyond a court with limited expertise and resources
(and perhaps interest).1 76 Eskridge's call to investigate and weigh
current social values would complicate things even further. The
more sources examined by a group of interpreters, the less likely
they are to agree-especially when it is unclear exactly what they are
trying to find. And there is value in agreement. As Justice
Ginsburg has explained, "[r]ule of law virtues of consistency,
predictability, clarity, and stability may be slighted when a court
routinely fails to act as a collegial body," which it does by "too
frequent[ly] resort[ing] to separate opinions." 11 Schauer thus
argues that
the reliance on plain meaning may be a hardly novel
suboptimizing second-best solution, a way in which people with
potentially divergent views and potentially different understandings of what the context would require may still be able to agree
about what the language they all share requires. Plain language
may provide some minimal mutual understanding that guards
face of widely disparate political
something that is shared in the
78
views and social experiences.
Brown v. Gardner supports this thesis: the dueling explanations of
seventy years of VA and congressional experience with § 1151 could
have easily caused the Justices to throw up their hands and look
only at the statutory language. In short, a textualist approach
constrains the Court; it confines the interpretive inquiry to more
manageable proportions and concomitantly increases the probability
of obtaining judicial agreement in particular cases.
Eskridge neglects Schauer's argument, a rare omission in his
otherwise comprehensive survey of the recent literature of statutory
interpretation. Perhaps the omission is because Eskridge is rel-

'" See Schauer, supra note 3, at 250-56; see also Schauer, supra note 85, at 715
(clarifying and elaborating on his claims about plain meaning).
176 See Schauer, supra note 3, at 253-54; see also Redish & Chung, supra note 7, at
856-57.
1" Ruth B. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1191
(1992). Ginsburg sees a similar threat from "the immoderate tone of statements
diverging from the position of the court's majority." Id.
1M8
Schauer, supra note 3, at 254-55.
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atively unconcerned about constraining statutory interpreters. His
rejection of originalist theories includes a rejection of traditional
sources-statutory text, legislative intent, and statutory purposeeach of which originalist theories rely upon as objective sources
outside the interpreter that curb interpretive discretion. The few
constraints that Eskridge does note are quite different and less
constraining. He sees the "traditions of the surrounding culture
and of [the] professional culture" as limiting statutory interpreters. 7 9 But the limits imposed by that professional culture derive
from precisely those originalist values that Eskridge is willing to
sacrifice.
Eskridge also views the current Congress and the
President as imposing political checks on Supreme Court statutory
interpretation,'
but the notion of the political process as a
constraint suggests that an interpreter need only consider what she
can get away with. Eskridge thus invites consideration of congressional values and does little to prevent consideration of a judge's
own values. As Schauer has observed, "for the Court to lessen its
reliance on plain meaning would serve only to substitute for the
community's contingent normative choices the equally contingent
181
and equally normative choices of individual interpreters."
Eskridge's willingness to allow those choices to guide statutory
interpretation reflects his struggle to determine whether dynamic
statutory interpretation is consistent with the rule of law. That
question cannot be answered, he writes, because "there is no
consensus ...

as to the precise value and implications of democratic

theory and the rule of law." 18 2 "The rule of law sometimes means
rules, sometimes means process, and sometimes means values."'
For Eskridge, the rule of law is merely a sympathetic effort to
understand a statute in context,18 4 or "a professional or social
practice that respects commonly held conventions, traditions, and
priorities."185
179 P.

65.

" See p. 69.
Schauer, supra note 3, at 232.
18 p. 108; see also p. 175 (noting that "traditional rule of law or democratic cri181

teria... are.., elusive in a postmodern world").
183 p. log.
I' See p. 193 (expressing his belief that "the interpreter's fidelity to the rule of law
is nothing more (and nothing less) than a sympathetic effort to understand a statute
in the context of the problem at hand and of ongoing practice").
18

p. 175. Eskridge appears more friendly to traditional rule of law values in

other recent writings. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, The Rule of Law, supra note 2, at 265

(claiming that "a legal system satisfies the requirements of the rule of law if its
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This is a shriveled vision of the rule of law. The historical
antithesis of the rule of law is the rule of men. 186 The core concept
is the avoidance of arbitrary government decisionmaking. The
Framers demonstrated this concern in formulating the constitutional procedures for the creation of federal law. Article I,
Section 7 of the Constitution specifies the formal procedures for the
creation of federal law. These procedures delineate the way in
which Congress makes policy. Policy changes are accomplished
when Congress and the President approve a statute that selfconsciously makes new law. The executive branch agencies and the
judiciary then give effect to that new statute in cases to which it
applies. Although both the meaning of the statute and Congress's
purpose in enacting it may be unclear-even in those situations in
which Congress intended for the statute to apply only to particular
cases-the interpreter does her best job to remain faithful to the
statutory text, purpose, and history. If Congress does not like the
187
result, it can change the law again.

commands are general, knowable, and performable"); Eskridge & Frickey, Foreword,
supra note 2, at 76 (asserting that "[flor rule of law reasons, the Court owes
substantial loyalty to the Congress that enacts the statute," but concluding that "the
Court's new-found textualism only exacerbates the normative tension between
democracy and the rule of law, and that a more pragmatic approach better serves
both democratic and rule-of-law values").
18' See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("[T]he
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them:
to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men." (quoting MASS. CONST.
pt. 1, art. 30)). ForJustice Scalia's conception of the rule of law, see Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183, 1185 (1989)
(discussing his belief that "the establishment of broadly applicable general principles
[rather than narrow, fact-specific holdings] is an essential component of the judicial
process" and that "judges cannot create them out of whole cloth, but must find some
basis for them in the text that Congress or the Constitution has provided").
187 The manner in which the rule of law and democratic principles operate to
constrain statutory interpreters is discussed in Frank H. Easterbrook, Tex4 Histoty, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 63-69 (1994)
(observing that political society wants to confine judges and that "[l]aw does not
change in meaning as the political culture changes"); see also Farber, supra note 3, at
298 (describing how the principle of legislative supremacy can constrain statutory
of
interpreters); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "PlainMeaning":Justice Scalia'sJurisprudence
Strict Statutoy Construction, 17 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401,425 (1994) (contending
that "Justice Scalia's strongly held views on separation of powers and the rule of law
as a system of constraining rules" drive his theory of statutory interpretation);
Mashaw, supra note 11, at 845 (concluding that asking questions regarding
constitutional legitimacy "keeps interpreters within the constraints of law"); W. David
Slawson, Legislative Historj and the Need to Bring Statutorj InterpretationUnder the Rule
of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1992) (advocating a "law as statute" theory that
would "provide a principled and effective constraint on the use oflegislative history").
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Dynamic statutory interpretation challenges this understanding
at nearly every step. Executive agencies may move beyond or even
against legislative expectations if they have good policy reasons for
doing so. Judges should be concerned about being overruled by the
current Congress rather than being completely faithful to the
enacting Congress. The only correct interpretation of a statute is
one that is consistent with certain preferred normative values which
society accepts. In short, Eskridge's view of the rule of law is like
his definition of dynamic statutory interpretation: it is defined not
by what it is, but by what it is not.1 ..
As Eskridge notes, the traditional understanding of the rule of
law has become more appealing to those who oppose the conservative direction of the Supreme Court.18 9 The 104th Congress may
revive that understanding even further. The meaning of the rule of
law and its implications for statutory interpretation merit much
greater study, but one simple point shows why dynamic statutory
interpretation's view of the rule of law is suddenly less attractive.
My sympathy with much (albeit not all) of the Contract with
America notwithstanding, it is not the lens through which all federal
statutes should now be read.
CONCLUSION
Anyone who has ever tried to interpret a statute owes a
substantial debt to William Eskridge. His writings, culminating in
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, have both disclosed the lack of

thought behind many traditional conceptions of statutory interpretation and advanced a forceful argument for a dynamic approach. He
has challenged those who favor a textualist, originalist, or indeed
any other theory of statutory interpretation to articulate their
position better. And others can certainly learn from his example of
applying the insights of disparate legal theories to statutory
interpretation. His contribution to the debate is immeasurable.
But Eskridge is far better at exposing the flaws in originalist
theories than he is at defending his own vision of dynamic statutory
'" Daniel Rodriguez argues that Eskridge's view of the rule of law fails to explain
"why a court empowered to approach statutes dynamically should be tethered to the
language and history of a statute at all." Rodriguez, supra note 13, at 939.
"'iSee p. 272 ("The legal community showed renewed interest in the rule of law
and constrained judicial decision making in the 1980s, partly because many of the
activist experiments of the Warren and Burger Courts have not turned out well and
partly because liberals feared the consequences of an activist Reagan-Bush Court.").
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interpretation. This is so even though he starts with the deck
stacked in his favor: it is hard to criticize a theory that presupposes
that there is no "right" answer by which to judge an interpretation.
Where Eskridge fails is in his overstatement of the dynamism
inherent in originalist approaches-particularly in a textualist
approach-and in his narrow view of the rule of law.
The increasingly textualist approach followed by the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Gardner and numerous other recent cases
possesses many of the virtues that a dynamic approach lacks. It
produces results that are faithful to the enacting Congress and that
are accessible to a casual reader of the statute. It avoids unsolvable
disputes about the policy wisdom of the statute. It constrains
interpreters-albeit imperfectly, but in a real way nonetheless. It is
faithful to-not just sympathetic toward-the rule of law. And it
treats the values of Newt Gingrich (or any other legislator) as
relevant only if Congress and the President have seen fit to adopt
them. Congress is dynamic; the statutes it enacts are not.

